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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN
ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs, Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,

vs.

No. 9945

RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R. FARRAR, )
his wife, Defendants. and SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellaat,

vs.

No. 9946

LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN
ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Respondents and Cross-.L-\ppellants

l"ROSS-..:\PPEAL,

l".~.-\SE

XO. 9945

c.oJne no"~ the plaintiffs and respondents in case
~~ o. 9945. X o. 2449 in the trial court. and hereby crossappeal to the (Ttah Supreme Court from the Judgment
an(l Decree entered by the trial court on plaintiff's
con1plaint in s:1id case X o. :2-!49. said judgn1ent having
1
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been entered on the 14th day of June, 1963, the plaintiffs' motion for new trial having been denied on the
5th day of July, 1963. Appellant's brief herein was
served and filed on September 6, 1963.

STA'l"'EMEN'l' OE., CASE ON 1\_PPEAL
'l,he buyers under a Uniform Real Estate Contract invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court for the
purpose of adjudicating their rights to damages, and,
alternatively, for specific performance as a consequence
of defendants having failed to perform certain promises
according to the intentions of the parties at the time
the contract was executed. This case was assigned No.
2449 in the court below. The assignee of the sellers filed
a cross-complaint in the same action, and, alternatively
in a second case (No. 2456 below) urged the court to
grant a judgment against the buyers for alleged unla~r
ful detainer and possession of the property.

DISPOSI'l,ION IN LOWER COURT
The cases being consolidated for trial, the lower
court found against the buyers in No. 2449 (No. 9945
on appeal) and against the sellers in both No. 2449 and
2456 (No. 9945 and 9946 on appeal) . The court entered
no cause of action against all parties.

RELIEF, SOCGHT ON APPEAL
'l.,he buyers urg'e this court on appeal to affir1n the
judgment of the trial court whereby the sellers were
2
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denied relief for alleged unla,vful detainer and for
restitution of the pretnises. 'rhe buyers urge that the
trial eourt's j udgtnent against them on their original
rotnplaint be reversed and that a ne'v trial be U\\·arded
\rherehy they \vould be afforded an opportunity to prove
the :unoun t of datnages ''" hich they have sustained as a
result of the sellers' breach, and that such damages be
on·-sct against any liability to the sellers in the nature of
payntents due under the contract. Buyers urge this court
to instruct the trial court to determine the rights of the
parties, and order that the sellers be required to convey
the land involved to buyers upon such perfortnance as
is found to be due.

S'l'.Li. TE)lENT OF !?ACTS

The central and controlling issues in this litigation
involYe an interpretation of the intention of the parties
in connection \Vith the execution of a certain real estate
contract for the purchase and sale of a ranch at the
n1outh of Daniels Canyon in
asatch County. The
property involved is referred to in the record as the
"Daniels ("reek Ranch." That name '"ill be applied to
it for convenience in this brief. Because of the importance of the circumstances of the execution of the agreetnent and the kno,vledge of the parties of the prior history of the operation of previous o'vners and tenants,
it is necessary to describe in some detail the relationship
of the parties and the factual circumstances under "·hich
the agree1nent "·as negotiated.

''r

3
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On or about January 12, 1957, Ralph ,V. I~,arrar
and Helen R. Farrar, his "·ife, defendants in No. ~449~
acquired an interest in the Daniels Creek Ranch by
entering into an agreement to purchase the sa1ne fron1
La'' erda Lynn (Exhibit 7). The Farrars first leased
the ranch to a ~Ir. Van Camp, who had prior experience
in the dairy business. Mr. ''an Camp attempted to operate the ranch as a dairy but he failed in that enterprise
and cancelled the lease (R. 570-571). The next occupant
of the premises "ras a Mr. Mecham, who \vas in possession for approximately one and one-half years (R.
572). Then a man called Collier had the premises for
one and one-half years. Mr. Collier agreed to pay
$66,000 for the property. Mr. LaMont Bowers then
occupied the ranch for approximately one and one-half
years. Subsequent to Mr. Bowers, Aluminum Roofing
Company occupied the ranch, apparently under some
arrangement with Bowers. Each one of these tenants
in sequence attempted to operate the premises as a dairy
farm (R. 573-577). Each one of these tenants was unable to meet his commitments, either as buyers or lessees
of the premises.
Some time prior to September 25, 1960, Mr. Farrar
called upon Leo '!an Zyverden in response to a ne,vspaper advertisement of ';an Zyverden on some other
property. l"Ir. }..,arrar explained that he had the Daniels
Creek Ranch for sale and arrangements were made for
Mr. ''an Zyverden to see it (R. 498, 499). l\Ir. Farrar
explained that he was foreclosing on the people 'vho had
been in possession of the place and told ''an ZyYerden

4
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that the prior oeeupants had attetnpted to operate n
dairy (It. ~300). 'I'he condition of the barns and buildings
was inspceted. ~lr. \"an Zyverden explained to }4.,atTar
that the place 'vottld continue to be unsuccessful as a
dairy and that hit should be converted into a beef
operation" (R. 500-501}. :\Ir. \"an Zyverden testified
that he showed ~__,arrar that by converting the tnain
ranch into a grazing operation and leaving approxitnately a7 to 40 acres at the airport in hay, that the
enterprise could be operated tnuch n1ore econotnically
than as a stnall dairy. He specifically explained that
he \\rould expect to run 100 head of cattle (R. ~>1U-.3~0).
~Ir.

l 1,arrar a<lmitted that he told ~lr. 'Tan Zyverden
of the prior history of the ranch and the he kne'v that
:\Ir. '"an Zyverden intended to convert it fron1 a dairy
to a beef operation. He realized that the only manner
that he could expect to be paid for the property "·as to
enable the purchaser to convert from dairy to beef. He
realized that the milk base and the milking equipment
on the pretnises had no value to a beef raiser and that
he took that fact into account "Then he signed the purchase agreetnent 'vith the ,.,.. an Zyverden (R. 578-579).
~Ir.

, . . an Zyverden testified directly that he told
Farrar he "Tas not interested in the ranch as a dairy
operation and that Farrar said he 'vould pernut a
con,Tersion into a beef ranch (R. 503). )lr. , . . an Zyverden explained that in order to convert into a beef operation the milk equipn1ent and base 'vould have to be sold
or exchanged into beef (R. 503). , ... an Zyverden ex-

5
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plained to }__,arrar that he had no 1noney hin1self to go
into the beef business but that he had some Inachinery
and livestock and horses in Roosevelt and other places
and he would use this property as a down payment by
placing the assets on the ranch and permitting the seller
to retain a security interest in such property as 'vell as
the }-,arrar assets subject to the sale (R. 503). l 1.,arrar
and Van Zyverden decided that since it was then the fall
of the year and winter was approaching, there \vas no
feed on the premises, the milk base would be sold and the
money would be retained by 11-,arrar until such ti1ne as
the weather would open up in the spring and could be
used to purchase livestock ( R. 505) . The purchase
agreement which was executed by the parties is in the
record as Exhibit I. For the most part it is a standard
Uniform Real Estate Contract. The "rider" provides,
among other things, that "It is agreed that the Hi-Land
milk base ... and all milking equipment as above mentioned, can be exchanged for livestock or horses of equal
value, remaining security for the period of two years
as agreed above." At the time this agreement was executed Mr. Farrar knew that there was a provision in
his original contract "·ith La Verda Lynn whereby he
was prevented from conveying the base, unless, of course,
the seller would consent. The language of the Lynn
agreement relevant to the problem is as follows:
"It is understood and agreed that the HiLand milk base and 100 shares of capital stock
in the Hi-Land tnilk co1npany is included in the
sale, and that base is non-transferable during the
life of the agTeen1ent." (See Exhibit I.)
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.'

~lr.

~,alTar

1uhnitted that he did not tell \"an
Zyvcrden anything about the litnitation of the transferability of the tnilk base as contained in Exhibit a at the
ti1ne of the execution of the agreement ( R. 576). lie
ll'stitied that he had "mental reservations'' about the
rnilk base at the ti1ne he signed the agreement 'vith '"'"an
Zyverden but he did not discuss thetn "·ith \"'"an ZyYerden ( R. 576, 577).
'l'he eYidence is thus clear and uncontradicted that
at the time the parties executed the agreement, Ralph
\\r. l 1,arrar knew ~Ir. \'"an Zyverden intended that the
rnilk base and equip1nent "ras to be used to assist in
financing the 'ran Zyverden beef operation. It is only
reasonable to conclude that 1\Ir. Farrar did not expect
:\I r. :\Iickelson, the assignee of the seller's interest under
Exhibit 3, to raise any substantial objection to the transfer of the base; therefore he was perfectly 'villing to
undertake the obligation to enable ,.,. an Zyverden to
transfer the milk base and milking equipment in order
to raise capital for a beef operation. Farrar was sufficiently shrewd and logical to realize that only by undertaking that obligation could a sale be made to the ,.,. an
Zyverdens on the property.
After the agreement was signed, ~ir. Farrar had
possession of it for some period of time for the purpose
of getting his 'vife's signature. He struck out of the
description of the property to be sold the language
relatina
0 to 100 shares of stock of Hi-Land dairy
• and
approxin1ately t\\'0 or three "reeks later urged :\Ir. ,.,. an

7
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Zyverden to consent to such procedure. Mr. ''"an Zyverden agreed to the amendment (R. 506-507). It is
clear, ho,vever, that ~..,arrar had plenty of time to study
the provisions of the agreement with respect to the HiLand milk base between these t'vo dates.
Between September and approximately the 1niddle
of November, ')'"an Zyverden and Farrar had additional
discussions with respect to converting the milk base to
beef cattle (R. 509-510). Van Zyverden obtained fro1n
Hi-Land the name of a prospective purchaser of the
base named Pert. He requested that Farrar write a letter
to Hi-Land asking permission to transfer the base to
his prospect (R. 510-511). Mr. Farrar was very pleased
that he had a sale and indicated to Van Zyverden that
the sooner it 'vas sold, the better. Pert would pay $10 a
pound for whatever part of the base Hi-Land would
transfer, and this arrangement was acceptable to Farrar
(R. 512). Farrar assured ':an Zyverden that he would
immediately contact Hi-Land and ask them to transfer
the base to Mr. Pert.
Mr. Farrar wrote to Mr. Van Zyverden on November 2 (Exhibit 2), stating that he had "stopped at HiLand dairy and found that there are 479 pounds of base.
This would be reduced to 378 pounds ... in the event of
a sale. I see no reason why this cannot be sold to an
individual at a price of not less than $3,000 and if it were
worked on a trade for livestock would bring possibly
1nore. Inasmuch as you do not plan to put stock on the
farm this fall as was originally agreed, it will be neces-

8
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sary to ha ,.e the nlolley derived fron1 the sale of the base

plaeed in an aceount in tny narne until such tirne as stock
'vill be purchased .... I suggest that the base and tanks
be sold as conveniently us possible.,
On Decetnber ~7, :\lr. ~-,arrar \vrote to Hi-Land
dairy approving I:>ert as a buyer and requesting that
the base be transferred to hin1. Farrar admitted that this
letter "·as sent at ~lr. \~an Zyverden\ request and that
its purpose \vas to enable the sale or exchange of the
1nilk base pursuant to their agreement (R. 581-.>82}.
)lr. },arrar did not advise l\Ir. ~Iickelson of the
proposed tranefer to Pert. l-Ie did not ask ~lr. ~Iickel
son to consent to the assignment.
'l"he con1pelling evidentiary force of I~.,arrar's conduet at this ti1ne, however, is that he admitted that he
"'as acting to perform his obligations to , . . an Zyverden.
lie agreed to the Pert sale, tried to complete it quickly,
and instructed Mr. l""an Zyverden that the money '\Vas
to be banked in his name until spring "·hen cattle could
be purchased.
In failing to obtain )lr. Mickelsen's approval in
advance, Farrar miscalculated. ''Then l\Ir. ~Iickelsen
learned of the Farrar request he adYised Hi-Land that
he had a security
. interest in the base and that they. should
not allo"~ any transfer 'vithout his consent.
'!"hereafter, Farrnr did not attempt to resolve the
1natter "·ith ~1ickelsen so that he could perform the

9
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obligation contained in the 'ran Zyverden contract.
Hi-Land declined to allow the transfer without :\Iickclsen's consent.
Prior to the time of the trial, Farrar had never
advised Mr. 'Tan Zyverden that he could perform by
making a sale or exchange to Mr. Pert or to any other
person (R. 587). As of November I, 1962, Mr. and :Jlrs.
Farrar assigned their interest under the contract to the
defendant Seagull Investment Company (Exhibit 10).
Seagull agreed that it would keep, observe and perfor1n
"all of the terms, conditions and provisions of said
agreement that are to be kept, observed and performed
by the assignors."
The \ran Zyverdens made a tender of proof at the
trial with respect to damages. In addition to the machinery and livestock which the buyers delivered to the
sellers as down payment on the premises, \ran Zyverden
made improvements in the nature of new pump, fence
additions, well repairs and other co1nparable capital expenditures involving cash or equivalent payments of
$8,812.00 (R. 222). At the trial, plaintiff offered to
prove that there were specific discussions with Mr. Farrar concerning the profit which the buyer could have
made if he had been able to exchange the tnilk base for
young livestock ( R. 523, 524) . The offered testimony
would have been to the effect that the money received
frotn the sale of the Hi-Land milk base or the cattle
received on any exchange would provide the capital
necessary for a cattle operation. The amounts received
10
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frutn the sale \\'ottld be sufficient to purchase a pproxinuttely 100 head of young cal Yes . ..L\ t t\vo pounds of gain
per day during the grazing season, the increase on these
l'attle \\·ould proYide sufficient funds to Inake the payllletlts under the contract in the fall and some additional
snudl profit to the operator. ~lr. Farrar "·as told in
substance and effect that this was the precise manner
in 'rhich the purchaser intended to make paytnent. :\Ir.
I~,arrar recognized that these projections of \ran Zy\·erden "\Vere substantially accurate and it \vas agreeable
'vith hi1n that the operations should be so conducted.
'rhe 'vitness offered to testify that 100 young dairy
rattle hav-ing an ayerage \\'eight of 300 lbs. in the spring
\Vould gain on the average t\vo pounds per day, taking
into account reasonably anticipated losses. The evidenc-e
\\·as offered in support of two propositions: First, that
the parties intended and agreed at the time of the execution of the contract that the sellers enabling the milk
base to be exchanged for beef cattle was a conditional
performance to the performance of the buyer~ and secondly, that under the theory of Hadley Y. Baxendale
and Sections 330-331 of the Restatement of Contracts
the buyer "·as entitled to recover loss of profits because
they 'vere anticipated by the parties (R. 523-526).
After Farrar had been unable or unwilling to obtain )liekelsen's consent to the transfer of the base, and
during· the ti1ne he knew that , .. an Zyverden \Vas looking
to hin1 to obtain the result, he assigned his interest in the
contract to Seagull InYestn1ent Con1pany. The assignInent provides explicitly that the assignee assumes all

11
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the assignors' obligations under the contract (Ex. 7,
R. 242, Para. 3).
When Seagull refused to negotiate any solution
with the ,.,.an Zyverdens (R. 288), they filed their complaint in No. 2449 (R. 3, 4). The summons and conlplaint in No. 2~1449 were served upon Seagull on Decenlber 14, 1961 (R. 16). Seagull served a '"Notice of
Termination of Contract and Five Day Notice to acate
Premises" upon the 'Tan Zyverdens on January l, 1962
( R. 266-273) , but did not answer the complaint in the
action filed until after the prescribed 20 days had expired ( R. 19) . Instead, they filed a new complaint,
No. 2456, for alleged unlawful detainer, on January 16,
1962 (R. 258-273). Plaintiffs in No. 2449 tnoved for
dismissal of No. 2456 on the ground that such pleading
was a compulsory counterclai1n in the first action, and
that the default constituted a judgment ,,,hich was res
adjudicata (R. 274-276).

'T

After the default certificate against Seagull in No.
2449 had been entered, and before it had been set aside,
Seagull filed some requests for admissions in that action.
Plaintiffs moved that they be stricken on the ground
that Seagull's default had been entered and it had no
standing in the case (R. 25). 'Vithout waiting for rulings on the pending motions, Seagull had the clerk of
the court enter a "default certificate" against plaintiffs
in No. 2449 for failing to answer the requests for admissions (R. 294). Seagull's motion for reinstatement \vas
granted and its motion for summary judgment denied

12
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( It.

~B~3, ~98} . .. \II

of the infor1nn t ion referred to in the
rt·quests for ~uhnissions \Vas subsequently obtained
through \vrittt·n and oral interrogatories.
Seagull subsequently serYed n second notice. Exhibit ~> (R. ~a a) stating that ''this notice shall in no ,,·ay
ntl'ect the existing legal proceeding no'v pending concerning said property ... ''
1\t no titne during the trial, or subsequently, did
Seagull offer to file a supplemental complaint. As late
as July, 1963, n1ore than six months after the trial, Sea.~·ull "~as

demanding payments allegedly due in "N ovetnber, 1962 (R. 723-725). 'l.,he 1962 payments 'vere due,
if at all, at least ten months after the service of Exhibit
.3. clearly indicating that any termination of the right
of the , . . nn Zyverdens as buyers at that time had been
waived.

ARG LT:\IEN1.,
POINT I.
THE COUR'l., ERRED IN FAILIXG TO
FIND THr\..T THE PARTIES IN1,EXDED
'fliA'f THE SELLER ASSU)IE THE OBLIG.L-\'fiOX O:F' EX ABLING THE B"l.,.l.,.ER TO
l~OX, . . ERT THE )!ILK BASE AND EQ"LTIP:\IEX'f TO LI,... ESTOCK.
'l.,he contract provided that: "It is agreed that the
Hi-Land 1nilk base ... and all milking equipinent as
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above mentioned, can be exchanged for livestock or
horses of equal value, re1naining security for the period
of t\\,.O years as agreed above." 'l,he \ran Zyverdeus
asked the court to construe the agree1nent to the effect
that the Farrars warranted that the 'Tan Zyverdens
would be enabled to exchange the milk base and equipment for livestock. The trial court failed to make such
a finding. 'l,he conduct of the parties and the admissions
of Farrar under oath at the trial demonstrate conclusively that this ruling of the trial court was erroneous.
A. The intentions of the parties are co·ntrolling. This
court has uniformly held that the trial court should
determine the actual intention of the parties to the contracts in the light of such extrinsic evidence as is a Yailable to determine such intentions. In Burt v. Stringfellow et al._, (1914) 45 Ut. 207, 143 P. 234, the court
said:
"In case, however, a construction is called for,
the to rule to be applied is well stated in 2 Elliott
on Contracts ( 1913) Section 1508, in the following words:
'\Vhen a contract is ambiguous and open to
construction, the true end to be reached is to
ascertain what the parties intended, and when
that intention is found it prevails over verbal
inaccuracies, inapt expressions, and the dry
words of the stipulations. ,-fhe court should, as
far as possible, place itself in the position of
the parties ",.hen their minds met upon the
terms of the agreement, and then fro1n a consideration of the writing itself, its purpose, and
the circumstances surrounding the transaction,

14
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endeavor to asl'ertnin '"hat thev intended and
\\'hat tht'y agreed to do; i.e. upon \\'hat sense
or tnea n ing of the tertns use. their n1inds actually 1net. ~rhe purpose of all rules for the cousti'uction of eontracts is to aid in ascertainino·
the intention of the parties fro1n a constructio~
of the whole agreement.'

''I 11 other ·nHJrds, the rules of conBtruction
should be considered as ser7~onts, and not a.'t
nulsfcr.,.,·. and tluts one rule should not be gh,cn
undue pro1nincnce rt)hile another is given but
~~diyh t or no effect.'' ( En1phasis supplied.)
Applying the rule in the satne case the court stated :
"~l,he

question that '"e must detertnine. therefore, is: ''rhat \vas the intention of the parties to
the contract ... at the time it "'as entered into ....
In case parties have entered into a contract and
differ \\'ith regard to its meaning, and the terms
of the contract are doubtful or a1nbiguous. the
first duty of the court is to ascertain the actual
intention of the parties at the time the contract
\vas entered into. This intention must be deternlined frotn the language used by the parties
when applied to the subject-matter of the contract and the circtunseances and conditions surrounding the parties."
The Burt case \vas cited and its teachings applied
in [Tdy v. Jemen (192~), 63 Ut. 95,222 P. 597, ""here
the court said :
"The fortn of expression is inapt and a"'k,vard,
but. in the light of the circtunstances and conditions surrounding the parties. the Ineaning is
clear. The actual intention of the parties n1ust
prevail over dry \\'"ords, inapt expressions. and
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careless recitation in the contract, unless that intention is contrary to the plain sense and binding
words of the agreement. Caine v. Hagenbarth,
37 Utah, 69, 106 Pac. 945.
" 'The best construction is that which is made
by viewing the subject of the contract, as the
mass of mankind would view it; for it 1nay be
safely assumed that such was the aspect in which
the parties themselves viewed it. A result thus
obtained is exactly what is obtained from the
cardinal rule of intention.' Schuylkill, etc. Co. v.
Moore_, 2 What. (Pa.) 490."

B. The contemporaneous conduct of the parties
evidences an intention whereby the seller was obligated
to obtain the exchange of the milk base. Seagull Investment Company argued at the trial that the transfer of
the base to ,ran Zyverden in the spring of 1961 con-·
stituted compliance with the contract. This, however,
appears to be spurious. The agreement is explicit that
the seller was obligated to transfer to the buyer the milk
base as well as all other property subject to the sale.
The buyer was to receive the right and power to exchange
the milk base for livestock or horses of equal value.
Unless the buyer was to have the right to make such
an exchange to someone else, the specific language in
question would be meaningless and superfluous. Thus
it is clear from the agreement itself that the 'ran Zyverdens expected to exchange the milk base for livestock,
and the agreement could not have been satisfied by the
transfer of the base to the l'" an Zyverdens.
'fhe construction placed upon the agreement by
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the pnrties thenlsel,·es conten1plates that ~~arrar undertcok the ohligatio11 to enable the exchange. In ('ainc r.
1/aycnbart!t (1910), a7 Ut. 69. 106 P. 945, the eourt
a ppro,·cs the rule that the construction placed upon an
:tgreetnent hy the parties is controlling. "'\ t page 81 of
the lT tah Reporter the court said:
.. So the general paran1ount intent controls the
special intent, and in this \\·ay it sometitnes
becon1es necessary either to enlarge or to restrict
the ordinary Ineaning of \Vords in order to preserve the paran1ount intent of the parties to the
agree1nent. ( ~ Paige on l.,o11tracts, Sec. 1113.)
One of the cardinal rules requires that 'as bet\veen
t\vo constructions, each probable, one of "·hich
Blakes the contract fair and reasonable and the
other of "·hich Blakes it unfair and unreasonable,
the fortner should al\\·ays be preferred.' ( ~ J>aige
on Contracts. Sec. llil.) r\nother author, \vhose
\vork on contracts has, for many years. been recognized as a standard authority, natnely. Parsons
on Contracts, in ,.,. oltune 2 (9th Ed.) , star page
494, says: 'The first point is usually to ascertain
"·hat the parties themselves meant and understood.' "
Applying the rule in that case, the court said at
page 96:
"'The more that ''?e have reflected upon the
questions involved and the more "·e have considered the language contained in the contract
\vhen Yie,ved in the light afforded by the subjectInntter and the surrounding circumstances herein
detailed. the n1ore haYe \Ve become convinced that
appellant's contention ought to prevaiL and that
the trial court. in construing the language con-
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tained in the contract, overlooked the doctrine
which is well expressed in the scriptural text, that
it is 'not of the letter, but the spirit; for the letter
killeth, but the spirit giveth life.' "
At least four salient uncontradicted facts support
the construction that the parties intended that Farrar
warranted that the base could be exchanged for livestock
or horses of equal value:

First: The parties to the agreement kne\v that prior
efforts to operate a dairy farm on the property had been
unsuccessful. 1_1--.,arrar testified in substance that each of
the four prior operators of the ranch since the time he
had an interest in it had attempted a dairy operation
and had failed (R. 570-577). At the time of the negotiations with Van Zyverden, in fact, LaMont Bowers,
the immediate past occupant, was in default under a contract and it was necessary to give him a Notice to Quit
the Pre!fiises in order to complete the deal with ,,.,.an
Zyverdens. Farrar admitted that he told Van Zyverden
of the prior history of the operation and that he kne\v
that ,.,. an Zyverden intended to convert the place to a
livestock operation. He admitted that he realized in
negotiating the contract that the milk base and the
milking equipment on the premises had no value to a
beef raiser and that he took such facts into account when
he signed the purchase agreement ( R. 578-579) . It is
unreasonable to suppose that when both parties kne'v
that the property had failed to support a dairy operation
that \ran Zyverden \vould have agreed to pay nearly
$60,000 only to engage 111 a failing enterprise. The
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parties <.'leurly ('onteinplated that the ranch ,,·ottld be
used for the raising of livcs lock.

S ccond: It is undi~ putL·d that , . an Zyverden told
l·,nrrar that he had no e;;sh or other capital to enable hin1
to purchase beef or any other livestock. \'"an Zyverden
testified directly that he told Farrar he \Vould have to
operate the pren1ises fro1n the assets that were being
sold. ~~arrar knew that u n l('ss livestock were placed on
the pretnises, \,.an Zy\·erden could not reasonably expect
to make the payments. l~'arrar knew that \"an Zyverden's
econon1ic circutnstauee.'i "·ere such that the payn1ents
required under the cot1tract could not be made unless he
had the capital to operate on a paying basis; J4,arrar
kne\v that ,.,. an Zyyerden had to make enough xnoney
fron1 the ranch itself if the sellers were to realize the
.
price.
'l"hird: Farrar k1 ~t~\\·· that under his agreement "·ith
La l .. erda Lynn, \vhich had since been assigned by her
to Maurice Mickelsen, there \vas a restriction upon the
transferability of the base and that the base could not
be transferred 'vithout l\Iickelsen's consent. But Farrar
failed to disclose this fact to ,,. an Zyverden. Farrar
admitted that he did not tell 'ran Zyverden anything
about the limiation of the transferability of the milk base
nt or prior to the time of the execution of the agreement
(R. 576). He admitted that he did not ever sho"· the
Lvnn contract to 'Tan ZvYerden.
He testified that he
.
had "'mental reserYations" about the milk base at the
ti1ne he signed the 'Tan ~~ ~. Yerden agreement but he did
~
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not discuss them with 'ran Zrverden (R. 576-577).
It is unreasonable to suppose that Farrar would have
failed to advise Van Zyverden as to the reservations in
the Lynn contract.unless Farrar had intended to undertake the risk incident to making the exchange possible.
In other words, whe11 F"'arrar looked at the language of
the contract to the effect that the milk base "can be
exchanged,'' he had to realize that if the base could not
be exchanged he could not make a deal with 'ran Zyverden because \ran Zyverden expected to exchange the
base, in effect, for the working capital necessary to
operate the ranch. Farrar had to make the base exchangeable to make a deal with Van Zyverden. It is only
reasonable and logical to assume, therefore, that in his
own mind he undertook the risk incident to enabling
the exchange. It is submitted that the compelling force
of the argument cannot be answered by the appellants
in this case.

Fourth: After the agreement was signed, and when
the time came to exchange the base, Farrar undertook
to complete the exchange. Farrar admitted that his letter
of December 24 to Hi-Land dairy approving Pert as
a buyer and requesting that the base be transferred was
sent at Mr. Van Zyverden's request and that the purpose
of the letter was to enable the sale or exchange of the
milk base pursuant to his agreement with Van Zyverden
(R. 581, 582). Van Zyverden testified that after the
parties were advised by Hi-Land that Mickelsen had
refused to consent to the transfer, Farrar continued to
represent to him that he would 'vork the 1natter out 'vith
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~lickelseu

(R. ~111. ~>I~>) . ..t\.t no ti1ne did Ic,arrnr directly
or indirectly deny this testimony. Farrar did not ever
indicate to ,. an Zyverden, either directly or by implicntion prior to the assignment to Seagull Investment
(.'.ompany. that he did not expect to resolve the impasse
with :\lickelsen. It is submitted that Farrar's atten1pt
to perform den1onstrates unequivocally that he recognized that he had an obligation to perform. He kne\v
thut v· an Zyverden looked to him to make the exchange
possible in order that cattle or other livestock could be
ncquired to make the ranch pay out. It is significant
that\?" an Zyverden made substantial improvements upon
the premises during the spring of 1961 after the parties
had been notified that Mickelsen declined to consent
to the exchange. It is unreasonable to suppose that \ran
Zyverden \vould have continued to make such improvetnents unless Farrar had continued to assure him, as he
testified, that he \vould work the matter out "·ith Mickelsen so that the place could be successfully operated.
'fhe trial court obviously ignored the intentions
of the parties as reflected by their own testimony and
their conduct at the time and subsequent to the agreeInent. It is significant that the trial court did not make
a finding as to the intentions of the parties. It simply
determined ''that the wording of the contract and the
evidence offered by the plaintiffs fails to support plaintiffs' clain1'' (R. 189). The findings incorporate the
contract bet"·een the parties by reference (Finding
Xo. 2, R. :!04) :tnd the court found that the purpose
of the Dece1nber 27 letter from Farrar to Hi-Land
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dairy was "to bring about the sale or exchange of the
milk base pursuant to the F.,arrar-'ran Zyverden agreement" (Finding No. 6, R. 205), but the findings simply
say that "the Van Zyverdens were not damaged by any
default of the defendants in this action" 'vithout any
interpretation of the intention of the parties, either 'vith
respect to the language of the written agreement itself
or their contemporaneous conduct. Particularly, since
the interpretation of their intention is the central issue
in the case, the failure of the court to make a finding as
to their intention in the light of all the circumstances
requires reversal.

POINT II.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE VAN ZYVERDENS 'VERE
NOT DAMAGED BY SELLERS' DEFAULT.
The Van Zyverdens, in effect, conveyed personal
property to the Farrars of the agreed value of $5,000
as down payment on the premises. In the event the 'ran
Zyverdens were required to forfeit their interest, this
consideration would be totally lost. In addition, they
made capital expenditures in the nature of permanent
improvements on the premises of a value of $8,212.49,
including the reasonable value of their own labor (R.
220-222). A forfeiture \vould result in the loss of these
improvements and would unjustly benefit the sellers
and their assignee, Seagull Investment Company.
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~~ven

n1ore itnportunt to the \ran Zyverdens is the
faet thut they have been deprived of the use of the
pretnises for the purposes anticipated by them and the
J.1,arrurs at the titne of the purchase agreement. 'fhey
have been denied reasonably anticipated profits during
the two years that the sellers were in default.
Since Hadley v. Balrcndalc ( 1854), 9 Ex. Ch. 341.
the la '" has been clear that loss of profits are recoverable
\rhen they are provable with reasonable certainty, and
\vhere they are 'vithin the contemplation of both parties
as a probable result of a breach. The case is discussed in
1"'ictorial Laundry 'l'. Newman Industries, ( 1941) I All
Eng. 997, where it 'vas held that a person 'vho promised
to deliYer a large boiler to a laundry ""here it \vas needed
for immediate use in the business had reason to foresee
loss of profits for business that the use of the boiler \vould
tnake possible. Section 331 of the Restatement on Contracts states the rule as follows :
"Damages are recoverable for losses caused or
for profits and other gains prevented by the
breach only to the extent that the evidence affords
a sufficien"t basis for estimating their amount in
money \\"ith reasonable certainty."
Illustrations 4, 5, and 10 are helpful in applying the
general principle to the case at bar.
"-t. A sells seed to B, ~,·arranted by A to be

Bristol cabbage seed. The seed is worthless mixed
seed; but 'vhile una""are of this, B sets out 105,000 plants raised fron1 it. The ~rop produced is
aood onlv
for cattle. B has a right to the Yalue
h
•
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of a crop of Bristol cabbage that would be produced under the existing conditions, less the value
of the crop that is actually produced, if his evidence gives a sufficient basis for estimating these
a1nounts.
"5. A contracts to permit his established coal
mine to be operated by B and to pay B $1.60 per

ton for coal produced. The mine has been opera ted for a long period and its veins are well est a blished. In an action for A's breach, by preventing
B from operating the mine, B proves satisfactorily that the mine has regularly produced 200
tons per day at a net cost of $1.40 per ton. The
profits that B would have made from operating
the mine are not too uncertain for inclusion in the
damages awarded.

*

*

*

"'10. A employs B as master of a whaling ship

on a five-year voyage, the compensation to be a
share of the net proceeds of oil taken on the
voyage. After two years B is "rrongfully discharged and at once brings action. Although
the earnings of the ship after B's discharge are
contingent and uncertain, B may be able to lay
a sufficient basis for their estimation by giving
evidence of the conditions and experience in the
whaling industry."
This court approved an instruction permitting a
loss of anticipated profits in Park 'V. Moorman Manufacturing Co. (1952), 121 Gt. 339, 241 P. (2d) 914.
It is undisputed in the instant case that the parties
discussed and agreed upon the concept that profits could
be made fron1 the Daniels Creek Ranch only
.. if it "·as
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operuted as a livestock enterprise, and that the \Tan
Zyverdens \vould have to convert son1e of the existing
:lssets subject to the sale to livestock to enable then1 to
operate on this basis. I>laintifi's offered to prove a specifi<' series of conversations bet,veen \Tan ZyYerden and
~~arrar in 'vhich I~~arrar "·as advised in substance and
cfi'cet that the sale of the tnilk base and equipment 'vould
provide sufficient cash to purchase approximately 100
head of cal Yes in the early part of the season and that the
ralves could expect to gain two pounds per day during
the grazing season. Mr. ~,arrar acknowledged the accuraey of Van Zyverden's analysis of the proposed operation and his projection of profits. Van Zyverden offered
further to testify that he \vas acquainted with the prices
of cattle and livestock during the spring and sum1ner
of 1961 and that such profit as was available frotn increase of weight on cattle during that P.eriod of time
\vould hav·e been sufficient to enable him to make the
paytnents on the contract. The evidence was offered in
support of t\vo propositions:
First, that the parties in fact contend that the obligation to pay "·as conditioned upon performance of the
obligations of the sellers to obtain the transfer of the
base, and secondly, under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale and Section 330-331 of the Restatement on Contracts ( R. 524-526) .
rfhe court rejected the offer of proof. It is important to observe that the basis of the court's ruling was
that future profits \Vere not recoverable and not that the
offer of proof "·as insufficient ( R. 523) .
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It is submitted that the ruling of the court denying
the plaintiffs inN o. 2-i49 the right to recover for loss of
profits under the circumstances of this case is clearly
erroneous and requires reversal. In the event of the
court should be of the view that the record is insufficient
at this time to prove or calculate actual da1nages, the
trial court should be instructed to hold an additional
hearing so that actual1narket quotations on beef for the
spring and fall of 1961 can be included in the record.
Actually, such damages can be computed by reference
to readily available market data. There are approximately 180 days of grazing available in the Heber
'Talley. At two pounds per day, 100 head of cattle \vould
gain 200 pounds per day or 36,000 pounds. At 25c per
pound, the amount of gain per year would be $9,000.00.
Upon analysis, there is no more reason for denying
promisee loss of profits as an ultimate of damage than
loss of any other benefit of his bargain. Corbin analyzes
the problem as follows:
"A profit is the net pecuniary gain from a
transaction. The profit to be made from a contract by one of the parties thereto is the full value
of the performance promised him by the other
party, diminished by the cost of his own performance that he contracts to render in exchange."
Where the profit \vas in terms of a cormnodity having a definite and relatively uniform market price a loss
of profits should no more be denied than if the contract
was for the exchange of two commodities, cf. the discussion in Corbin supra, pp. 119-120. Even if loss of
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profits is not recoverable. there is no reason for denvi1,,,.
..
rcco,·ery of the $1:J,812.49 invested in the property if
forfeiture is required as the result of the seller's o\\·n
conduct.
~

POINT III.
'1'HE SELLERS' BREACH GI\ , .. ~~
'l'O A CAlTSE 0~" .r\CTION BY THE
ERS FOR DA~IAGES, OR SPECI~"Il~
~"ORMANCE, OR BOTH, AGAINS'r
(~ULL

IN\"ES'l"~IEN'f

RISE
IJUYPERSEA-

CO~IPANY.

A. The assutll]Jtivn of the Sellers' duties and liabilities under the Van Zyvcrdcn-Farrar agrcc1nent Teas Ct?'pressly assumed by Seagull.

The court found that "On or about X ovember 1,
1961, the Farrars assigned their interest under the \ran
Zyverden contract to Seagull Investment Company.
'fhe ~-.,arrar-Seagull assignment is in writing and incorporated herein by reference, and provides in substance that the assignees will perform the provisions
of the\" an Zyverden agreen1ent and will hold the assignors harmless from any claim or demand arising from
any act or otnission of the assignee.''
The assignment is in evidence as Exhibit X o. 10.
Paragraph 3 (a) expressly provides that the assignee
\viii perforn1 all of the obligations of the assignor.

B. The

bu}Jer is entitled to assert a remedy for spe-

cific ]Jerfornlancc "lt)ith apprOJJriate abatement constitut27
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ing compensatory damages for the loss ~·ustained VlJ
Sellers~ breach.

'Tan Zyverdens proposed that the amount of Inoney
which they were entitled to receive as damages for the
sellers' breach be applied against the obligations of the
buyers under the contract, and that the sellers be required to convey in accordance with their contractual
obligations after having made such credit. It 'vas suggested that there was an applicable analogy to the situation "~here specific performance with abatement could
be obtained in situations where the seller of land was
unable to convey all that he had bargained for under
an executory real estate contract.
Corbin states the abatement principle as follows:
"If a vendor is inable to transfer title to all
of the land that he contracted to transfer, or if
there are defects in his title that he cannot
remove, the vendee may desire such performance
as is within the vendor's ability. In such cases the
vendee can get specific performance with respect
to the part that the vendor can transfer, with
compensation, an abatement in price proportionate to the deficiency or defect, or an indemnity
against future injury. 'l.,hus, if one has contracted
to transfer complete title, and his wife who has
a dower interest refuses to join in the deed, the
vendee can con1pel a transfer of such interest as
the promisor has, "'ith an abate1nent for the value
of the "rife's interest. It has been so held even
though the vendee kne"~ when the contract 'vas
made that the wife had an interest and was not
bound to join in the conveyance." Corbin on
Contracts, ol. 5, p. 687.

'T
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'rhe san1e rule appears in the Restate1nent of the
l:t\\' of l'.ontracts in Section 365. Illustration 3 to the
stl'tion is as follows:
""3. 1\ contracts to transfer land in fee sitnple

to B. A is unable to perform in full because of
the existence of a building restriction. IJ rna v be
given a decree for the transfer by A of ~uch
!nterest as he has, 'vith compensation or an abatement for the building restriction."
In the instant case, the Farrars agreed to the sale
of specific real and personal property, and as a part of
the consideration to be paid by the buyers, agreed in
addition that they would enable the exchange of part of
these assets to be convertible to other property in order
that the ranch might be successfully operated. It is
suggested that . .\ran Zyverden received less than the protnised perforn1ance in a manner comparable to the buyer
'rho receives less acreage than the seller has agreed to
convey. Damages can properly be assessed in a dollar
stun and applied against the purchase price, including
interest, and other ite1ns agreed to be discharged by the
buyer in the purchase contract. The analogy to the
abaternent principle is particularly useful in the instant
case because it \vould prevent the sellers from benefiting
frotn their own wrong.
It is obvious from the record in this case that the value
of the property has substantially increased between
the time the contract 'vas executed and the time of trial.
'fhere is evidence before the court to the effect that the
present Yalue of the property would be approximately
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$85,000. If the sellers successfully forfeit the buyers'
interest under the circumstances here, they '"ill ha\·e
deprived buyers of the real fruits of the agreement
through their own conduct. This is an instance 'vhere
damages and specific performance should both be provided to place the parties in their respective positions
to the same extent as though the contract had originally
been discharged by the parties in accordance with their
initial intentions. While no case has been found explicitly adjudicating the kind of result requested by the
'Tan Zyverdens, it is submitted that the court has sufficiently broad powers to achieve the indicated result and
that such result 'vould achieve substantial justice between the parties.

POINT IV.
SEAGULL CANNOT RECO,:ER
UNLA''TFUL DETAINER.

l 1"'0R

A. The trial court correctly ruled that unlawful
detainer was not established at the time of the trial.
Even assuming that the plaintiff was in default
under Exhibit 1, the defendant Seagull must, in order
to succeed in its unlawful detainer action, prove that the
plaintiff was given the requisite statutory notice. Carsten
v. Hansen (1944), 107 Ut. 234, 152 P.(2d) 954. 'fhis
the defendant has failed to do.
Utah's unlawful detainer statute only applies to
tenants of real property for a tern1 less than life ( 78-3630
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a tT.<...,.A.).

~\s

this eourt hus noted in the case of ]Jcar('c
t'. Schurt.:· (1954),:! Ut. (2d) 1:!-t, 270 P. (2d) -t42. th('
rt·lntionship of vendor-,·endee under a Unifortn Real
~~state l.,ontract is not one of landlord-tenant to "·hicl,
the unlawful detainer statute applies. 'fhe court sa irl:
··In a situation '"here title is held until payment is conlplcte. the general conclusion to be drawn is that a conditional sale or mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
exists.'' Ibid at 127, Utah Reporter.

Under paragraph 16 (a) of Exhibit 1. the seller has
the election, upon the buyer's default, to serve the buyer
\rith written notice to remedy such default, and "upon
failure of the buyer to re1nedy the default \vi thin fiye ( ~j)
days after written notice ... the buyer agrees that the
seller tnay, at his option, re-enter and take possession of
said pretnises "~ithout legal processes as in its former
estate, together with all improvements and additions
made by the buyer thereon, and the said additions and
improvements shall retnain 'vith the land and become
the property of the seller;, the buyer becoming at once
a tenant at u:ill of the seller .. .n (Emphasis supplied.)

'fhus it is only upon the buyer's failure to remedy
a default within fiYe days after written notice that a
landlord-tenant relationship, to \vhich the unlavtrful detainer statute applies, is created.
Again. this court noted in the Pearce case, provisions such as the one set forth above in paragraph 16 (a)
of }~xhibit 1 "·ere "'undoubtedly adopted to obtain the
benefits of the unla"~ful detainer statute." (Ibid at 127.)
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If, however, Seagull Investment Company seeks
to claim the benefits of the unlawful detainer statute,
it must comply with the requirements of that statute,
and under that statute a tenant at will is only "guilty of
an unlawful detainer" if he remains in possession "after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five days''
(57 -36-3

U.C.A.).

In this case the defendant Seagull did serve the
plaintiff on or about the 3rd day of January, 1962, 'rith
a five-day Notice to Vacate Premises (see Notice attached to Exhibit 5) and pursuant to such notice on
page 2 notified the plaintiff that it was electing to exercise its rights pursuant to paragraph 16 (a) of Exhibit 1,
and further gave the plaintiff five days to remedy the
alleged defaults.
Even assuming that the defendant was in default
and that he failed to cure such defaults within five days
after the service of the above mentioned Notice, Seagull
could not successfully maintain an unlawful detainer
action against the plaintiff until it had served the plaintiff with the requisite five-day statutory notice. The first
notice, pursuant to paragraph 16 (a), did not suffice
for the statutory notice because only upon the failure
of the plaintiff after five days to remedy the alleged
defaults \vould a landlord-tenant relationship exist to
which the unla,vful detainer statute can apply, and the
landlord-tenant relationship could then only be terminated pursuant to the five-day notice required by the
statute.
32
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1'/tis ala t u tor.tJ five-da.IJ not icc 1.cas net't'r scrt·l'd
upon the plaintiff' JJrior to the tintc that defendant's
action for unla"lcful detainer was c·unl7ncnccd, either b.11
suit l'i'l.,il ~\"o. ~456 or in its counterclaim to suit Gliril
.\' o. ~4-19. (See return of service attached to Exhibit ~)).
Subsequent to the conunencement of defendant Seagull's action for unlawful detainer, the defendants. in
eft'ect recognizing the validity of the plaintiff's position
on the inadequacy of notice, caused a second notice
(Exhibit ~)) to be served on the plaintiff. This notice
\Vas \\·holly abortive, however, in the present cases. Seagull has now atten1pted to file an appropriate suppleInental pleading. Moreover, Exhibit ~> expressly provides that it shall "in no way affect the existing legnl
proceedings." All the pleadings in the cases before the
court are predicated upon the first notice, '"hich, as
shown, failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute.

Seag·ull is asking the court to apply a drastic and
penal remedy. It simply has not brought itself "·ithin
the statutory requirements to enable itself to maintain
the alleged remedy in the present actions."

B. S cay ull has waived any rights to recover for
unla~cful

detainer under the notices introduced at the

trial.
Both during the time the lawsuit was pending and
after the trial date, Seagull was demanding that the,.,. an
Zyverdens make the annual payments and discharge
the oblig·ation for taxes and insurance for the year ending· X oven1ber 30, 1962. At the time of the notices
33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

introduced at the trial, Seagull was clai1ning a default
only for alleged deficient performances through the fall
of 1961.
The record now shows that in July, 1963, Seagull
served upon the \~an Zyverdens a ''Notice to Remedy
Default or to Quit" in which it was claimed that \Tan
Zyverdens \-vere indebted for the payments for the years
1962 as 'veil as 1961, and a demand was made "that you
remedy all your defaults in the performance of your
obligations" under the contract within five days (R. 723725). Even since the judgment of the trial court, therefore, Seagull has taken a legal position inconsistent with
its right to recover for unlawful detainer or obtain any
other rights under the prior notices. Certainly Seagull
cannot argue that the \Tan Zyverdens were tenants at
will in F..,ebruary, 1962. and at the same time Seagull
was entitled to receive a payment due from them, as
buyer, in November, 1962.
It is generally held that the taking of a legal position inconsistent with the forfeiture of the buyer's interest under an executory land contract waives any
right obtained by the seller under a notice of forfeiture.
The editor of an annotation at 107 ALR 395 states:
"An option to forfeit because of default occurring as to a particular payment or payments
is waived by the Yenor's adoption of a legal remedy inconsistent "·ith such forfeiture ...
''Thus an action to recoYer the unpaid purchase 1noney, or a part thereof, is a "·aiYer of any
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right of' forfeiture Leeause of the non-paytnent
of such 1noney ... ( l,iliug cases.)
1

In ( /ark

'l,. -L\rt'lliiUUlfl (

1H98) 56 ~eb. 36~, 76 X.\\r.

892. a vendor "·aived a 11otiee of declaration of forfeiture

and then attetnpted to e11force the contract. It \Vas held
that he \\·aived the benefit of the notice. 'rhe court said:

"'lr pon these faets, \Ve think the defendants
arc not in an attitude to insist that there \\ras an
effective reseiss ion of the contracts. They "·ere
treated by botl1 parties as being in full force and
effect. The <·on'p:tlly recognized their valiclity.
and waived the rig·ht of forfeiture by atten1pting
"
to enforce thetn .
A fortiori whPre a "lcller's right is claimed to be
for unla,vful detainer. the assertion of a claim inconsistent \vith the notice declaring the buyer's interest
forfeited and making the buyer a tenant at \viii is "·aived
by a demand of a pa~-tnen due on the contract after
the notice was served.

It should be rcalizt·d by the court that the \"'"an
Zyverdens do not take an inconsistent position when
they urge the court to rule that the prior notices were
insufficient under the unla "yful detainer statute and that
the subsequent conduct of Seagull constitutes a waiver
of the notices. Unla,vful detainer is a penal and harsh
remedy. Not only does Seagull attempt to obtain a
judgment for treble dan1ages, it seeks at the same time
to forfeit values of approximately $18,000 which , . . an
Zyverdens could have either paid to the sellers or put
into the property in tern1s of permanent improvements.
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The court should not be sympathetic to invoke its p<n,·ers
to aid Seagull under these circumstances.
It is, of course, well established la'" that the party
to an executory contract guilty of a first breach cannot
maintain an action on the agreement. See Restatement
on Contracts, Section 278, comment (a) . As CrossAppellants establish under Points I and II of this
brief, Seagull was in default prior to the time 'vhen
the buyer's payments became due. The default consisted of a failure to cause the performance of the condition precedent. The damages sustained by the buyers
should be off-set against the liabilities for these payments. (See argument in Point III of this brief). On
this basis, the notices of defaults were wholly abortive
and of no effect because the obligations of the buyers
were postponed until the equities and rights of the parties were adjusted as a result of seller's default.
Even, however, if the court disagrees with the position taken by the buyers on Points I, II and III of
this brief, Seagull cannot prevail upon any unlawful
detainer theory for the reasons stated in this point of
the brief.
It is submitted that under any theory, the trial
court's judgment denying Seagull restitution of the
premises should be affirmed.
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I>OIN'l" \".

SE.c\GLTLL SIIOULD :NO'l" BE PElt:\II'f'l'~D

.L\XD

'rO

IJENE~"l'l"

F"ROjl ITS OWN ERRORS

INl~ONSIS'l"ENCIES.

'l'he relief sought by Seagull in this litigation is
hasieally punitive. It seeks damages for unlawful detainer~ it is attempting to forfeit the interest acquired
hy the buyers in the Daniels Creek Ranch; it has resis ted consistently efforts of the buyers to adjust the
equities of the parties either through negotiations or
pursuant to the original action filed by the buyers in
\\r asatch County.

Despite the fact that it seeks the imposition of the
hnrsh remedies incident to unlawful detainer, it has
pursued a course of blunders and inconsistencies. Yet
it asks this court on appeal in effect to do its work for
it, to excuse it from its inconsistencies, and to require
the \"an Zyverdens to bear the entire brunt of its own
errors.
'l"o begin "·ith, 'ran Zyverdens filed case No. 2-:t49
in ''' asatch County to obtain an orderly and peaceable
adjudication of their equities under the contract. The
record is clear beyond question that as long as the
sellers' position '"as assumed by ~Ir. and Mrs. Farrar
under the original ,.,. an Zyverden-Farrar contract, the
~"arrars were attempting to "\vork out a reasonable and
orderly adjustment of the problems involved as a result
of their not having been able to obtain the transfer of
the 1nilk base pursuant to the ,.,. an Zyverden agreen1ent.
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As soon as Seagull obtained the Farrar agreement, it
arbitrarily started making demands (R. 32-33).
When Van Zqverdens filed the complaint in X o.
2449 and served summons upon Seagull, it did not file
an answer or otherwise respond in that action until
after a default certificate was entered. While Seagull
was still in default, it filed certain requests for adnlissions ( R. 26-29) . At this time it had no standing in
the case. It was not entitled to have any response made
to the requests because its default had been entered.
Yet Seagull argues in its brfief that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because such requests
'vere not denied by the Van Zyverdens.
Rather than filing its purported claims against
the ,,..an Zyverdens as compulsory counterclaims under
Rules 12 and 13, Seagull filed a separate complaint but
the complaint was insufficient as far as unla,yful detainers is concerned because no notice had been required
at that time as provided in the statute. See the authorities cited in Point IV. At the pretrial, Judge 'l~uckett
indicated that if the Van Zyverdens were in default
one of the remedies available to Seagull was foreclosure.
He indicated that Seagull could not recover attorney's
fees if it was proceeding in unlawful detainer on a tort
theory rather than for restitution under the contract.
Seagull expressly, voluntarily, elected to proceed in
unlawful detainer for treble damages rather than on
some other theory ( R. 206, para. 1:2). 'rhis election \ras
1nade Yoluntarily at the pretrial by Seagull. Certainly
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if Seagull l'ontends that the \ . an Zyverdens are tenants
at \\'ill and the unla\vful detainer statute is applicable,
they cannot at the same ti1ne contend that the \""an
Zyverdens are buyers under the contract and should be
subjected to un}a,vful attorney's fees for the enfor< eJnent of rights given the seller under such agreement.
It is not suggested that the sellers did not have a cause
of' aetion for damages for buyers' default if they were
in default prior to termination of the agreement, but
if \"an Zyverdens' interest under the contract are terJninated, then the sellers' rights under the contract are
ter1ninated at the same time. It is certainly impossible
to assert a remedy for restitution against 'ran Zyverdens
as buyers if they are not buyers but tenants at will. The
ehoice as to 'vhether 'ran Zyverdens were to be treated
as tenants at will or buyers was one voluntarily made
by Seagull. Yet it asserts in its brief that it is entitled
to have the court make that choice for it, to award it
restitution and attorney's fees as though the choice had
not been made.
During the trial, Seagull offered Exhibit 5 in evidence and objection was 1nade on the ground that it
'vas immaterial. Repeatedly since the day of the trial
"·hen the offer "~as made, counsel for 'ran Zyverdens
has suggested that the appropriate and orderly method
of procedure ,,~as that a supplemental complaint be
filed to enable the court to adjudicate the issues raised
by the service of Exhibit 5. Seagull has stubbornly
refused and neglected to atten1pt to n1ake any such
:unendment. Judge Tuckett had the case under advise-
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ment for three months before he issued a ruling. 'fhere
'vas plenty of opportuntiy to file a supple1nental pleading during that time. Seagull "'as adYised orally and
by the briefs filed by the ,..,. an Zy,yerdens that the court
could not rule on the questions raised on Exhibit ~3
until supplemental pleadings 'vere filed bringing into
the service of the notice served after the filing of the
complaint. This court knows well that the \ran Zyverdens made the same suggestion in connection 'vith the
issuance of the extraordinary writ by this court in
No. 9917, following the filing of a new case by Seagull
in Salt Lake County.
Even after the issuance of the writ in No. 9917
Seagull persisted in its stubborn refusal to bring the
pleading·s to date in the Wasatch County cases by the
filing of a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading or otherwise. In fact, Seagull apparently realized
at that point that it could not successfully proceed
under the existing notices which were in issue in the
Wasatch County cases. The record shows that after
the issuance of the extraordinary 'vrit by this court
in No. 9917, Seagull served upon the ';ran Zyverdens
two additional notices. The first of these notices was
served on about July 8, 1963 (R. 723-726, 729). It
demands payment for the annual payments allegedly
due during N ove1nber, 1962. This notice constitutes a
clear recognition of the rights of the 'Tan Zyverdens as
buyers under the contract and a demand for the enforceInent of their oblig·ations a:; buyers after the service
of Exhibit 5, and in fact at all tin1es prior to the date
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ot' the service of the notice, nnn1ely July 8, 19t>a. 'rht."
seeond notice attetnpts to require the \ran Zyverdens
to quit the subject premises \vithin five days. Apparently it \vas served at a time between J u}y
. 8 and .J ul,·.
:!H, 1963, the exaet date not appearing in the record.

This court can take notice of the fact that Seagull
thereafter filed a second complaint in Salt Lake County,
despite the prohibition of the \vrit in No. 9917. 'fhe
second case was filed in Aug·ust, 1963. It consists of
four causes of action and the prayer detnands judgInent for the paytnents allegedly due frotn the ,,.. an
Zyverdens as buyers under the real estate contract in
question, including interest, taxes and 'vater assesstnents for the years 1961 and 196:2. It is thus clear that
Seagull is now attempting to obtain judgment for
payments tnade after the service of Exhibit 5 and after
the titne of the trial. In other words, Seagull is now
asking this court to determine that it is entitled to
restitution of the premises and a judgment for unlawful
detainer by reason of notices served not later than
February, 1962 and at the same time it is urging the
District Court of Salt Lake County to determine that
it is entitled to a judgment for payments which the
, . .an Zyverdens purportedly o've as buyers in November,
1962.

Seagull urges this court to hold that Judge Tuckett
should have made a final judgment determining the ultinlate rights of the parties in accordance '"ith Rule 54 (c)
(I). (Appellant~s brief, 19-20). It is submitted that
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Seagull has the responsibility of placing before the trial
court the appropriate pleadings and theories upon \vhich
it claims relief. Assuming that the 'ran Zyverdens are
in default, Seagull has the right to n1ake so1ne election
of remedies. It cannot require the court to make the election if it chooses the wrong course. There is no 'vay that
Seagull can place upon this court the burden of relieving it from its inconsistencies.
The ,,. an Zyverdens have attempted from the
beginning in this action to obtain an orderly adjudication
of their rights under the agreement. They believe that
it would now be appropriate for this court to remand
the cause to Wasatch County with instructions to determine the balances due back and forth between the parties
and to enter an appropriate decree for damage against
an offending party. If the Van Zyverdens are not
entitled to recover any damages, or if additional evidence is required to make more certain any amount of
damages \\'hich they should receive, these questions can
be appropriately determined by the District Court of
Wasatch County under the original pleadings in No.
2449. If supplemental pleadings are required at this
time to bring to date any relevant facts or events which
have occurred since the filing of the original pleadings
in No. 2449, leave might even now be given to amend
to permit appropriate adjudication of the issues. The
\Tan Zyverdens insist, however, that the judgment of
the District Court with respect to the disposition of Seagull's present con1plaint is entirely appropriate and
should be sustained absent appropriate amendments by
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~cagull.

'l'he urgutnents 'vhich Seagull now tnakes iu
Point I \r of its brief, that it should be awarded some
relief 'vhether sueh relief is de1nanded or not, and in
Points l' and \r I that it is entitled to so1ne atnount in
d:unages and for attorney's fees under the present status
of the record are spurious. 'l.,he arguments Inade under
}loint I of Seagull's brief that certain statements in
requests for ad1nissions are admitted cannot be taken
seriously in this litig·a tion. Judge '.fuckett at least twice
denied Seagull's 1notions for sutnmary judgment 'vhen
it tnnde the sa1ne argument. The basis of the court's
ruling \vas substantially that the information otherwise
contained in the file appropriately advised Seagull of
the vie"·s of the "\:'"an Zyverdens and that Seagull had
no standing at the time its requests were filed.
It is suggested that Seagull's arguments, to the
effect that amendments and supplements to pleadings
should be made by the court even in the absence of any
tender of such pleadings by Seagull, are captious.

lrnder all of the circumstances in this case, it seems
fair to suggest to the court that Seagull's real interest
here is to proceed in such a manner that the 'ran Zyverdens haYe no actual or genuine opportunity to realize
the present values of the property. If Seagull genuinely
desires an orderly adjudication of the real issues, it has
had plenty of opportunity to present them to the court
for deter1nina tion.
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SUM~lARY

AND

l~ONCLUSION

'fhe judgment of the trial court denying relief to
Seagull under the status of the existing pleadings was
entirely appropriate and should be affirmed. 'l.,he trial
court erred in failing to determine that the parties intended that the seller assumed the obligation of enabling
the buyer to convert the milk base and equipment to
livestock and that such failure constituted a breach by
the seller. It further erred in denying the ,---an Zyverdens
the right to prove damages in the nature of loss of
profits. 'This court should remand the case to the trial
court with instructions to make appropriate findings,
particularly with respect to the amount of damages
sustained by Van Zyverdens.
In the event this court feels that Seagull has not
had a reasonable opportunity to a1nend its pleadings,
despite all of the facts and circumstances appearing in
the record, it is submitted that this court has the power
to permit appropriate amendments and supplemental
pleadings upon remand.
Respectfully submitted this 't'th day of October,
1963.

GEORGE

~1. ~Ic~IILLAN

1020 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

AttornelJ for Van Zyverdens
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